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Abstract 
Online Social Networks (OSNs) have become a mainstream cultural phenomenon for millions of Internet users. More importantly, OSNs expose 
now information from multiple social spheres e.g. personal information or professional activity. We identify two stakeholders in online social 
networks: the OSN users and the OSN itself. On one hand, OSN users share an astonishing amount of information ranging from personal to 
professional. On the other hand, OSN services handle users’ information and manage all users’ activities in the network, being responsible for the 
correct functioning of its services and maintaining a profitable business model. Indirectly, this translates into ensuring that their users continue to 
happily use their services without becoming victims of malicious actions. We thus classify online social networks privacy and security issues into 
two categories of attacks on users and OSN. In this paper we propose a utility based association rule hiding algorithm for privacy preserving user 
profiles data against attacks from OSN users or even OSN applications. Experimental has been conducted on samples of real datasets. Experimental 
has been showed less attribute modification in the released user's profiles datasets. 
Keywords: online social networks; user's profiles; privacy preserving; profiles attacks. 
1. Introduction 
Online Social Networks (OSNs) have become a mainstream cultural phenomenon for millions of Internet users. 
Combining user-constructed profiles with communication mechanisms that enable users to be pseudo-permanently 
“in touch”, OSNs leverage users’ real-world social relationships and blend even more our online and offline lives. 
Facebook in 2015 had more than 1.5 billion monthly active users and it was the second most visited site on the Internet 
[1]. Twitter, a social micro-blogging platform, claims over 500 million users. In addition, the social networking will 
be the fourth most popular online activity [2].  
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Companies are mining trends on Facebook and Twitter to create viral content for shares and likes. Employers are 
checking Facebook, LinkedIn and Twitter profiles of job candidates. Law enforcement organizations are gleaning 
evidence from OSNs to solve crimes. Activities on online social platforms change political regimes [2]and swing 
election results. 
More importantly, OSNs expose now information from multiple social spheres. For example, personal information 
on Facebook and professional activity on LinkedIn that is aggregated leads to uncomfortably detailed profiles [3]. 
1.1. Privacy Attacks in Online Social Networks 
Privacy attacks in online social networks can be classified based on the stakeholders of the OSN and the forms of 
attack targeted at the stakeholders. We identify two stakeholders in online social networks: the OSN users and the 
OSN itself. 
On one hand, OSN users share an astonishing amount of information ranging from personal to professional. The 
misuse of this information can have significant consequences. On the other hand, OSN services handle users’ 
information and manage all users’ activities in the network, being responsible for the correct functioning of its services 
and maintaining a profitable business model. Indirectly, this translates into ensuring that their users continue to happily 
use their services without becoming victims of malicious actions. 
We classify online social network privacy and security issues into the following attacks categories (Fig. 1). 
 
Fig. 1: OSN attacks categories 
(1) Attacks on Users: these attacks are isolated, targeting a small population of random or specific users. There are 
several types of attacks based on the attacker: (a) Attacks from other users[1, 2]. (b) Attacks from social applications 
[3]. (c) Attacks from the OSN [4]. (d) De-anonymization and inference attacks. OSN services publish social data for 
others (e.g., researchers, advertisers) to analyze and use for other purposes. 
(2) Attacks on the OSN: these attacks are aimed at the service provider itself, by threatening its core business. Such 
as Sybil Attacks [5-7], Crawling attacks [8], Social Spam[9], Distributed Denial-of-service attacks (DDoS) and 
Malware Attacks [10]. 
OSN users are facing multiple risks while using social applications. First, an application might be malicious; 
it could collect a high volume of user data for unwanted usage. For example, to show this vulnerability, BBC News 
developed a malicious application that could collect large amounts of user data in only three hours [11]. Second, 
application developers can violate developer policies to control user data. Application developers are supposed to 
abide by a set of rules set by the OSNs, called “developer policies”. Developer polices are intended to prohibit 
application developers from misusing personal information or forwarding it to other parties. However, reported 
incidents[11] show that applications violate these developer policies. For example, a Facebook application, “Top 
Friends” enabled everyone to view the birthday, gender and relationship status of all Top Friends users, even though 
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those users kept their privacy for those information to private, violating the developer policies that private information 
of friends are not accessible.  
Finally, third-party social applications can query more data about a user from an OSN, regardless whether 
needed or not for proper operation. A study by Felt and Evans [3] of150 of the top applications on Facebook shows 
that most of the applications only needed user name, friends, and their networks. However, 91% of social networking 
applications have accessed data that they do not need for operation. 
Data and knowledge hiding are two research directions that investigate how the privacy of raw data, or 
information, can be maintained either before or after the course of mining the data. 
In this paper we will present a new algorithm in the class of knowledge hiding area [12, 13], known as association 
rule hiding based privacy utility of attributes in online social user's profiles. Therefore, the challenge is to protect users 
and their information from other users. The contribution of this paper may be organized as follow: 
- Propose a framework for protecting OSN users and their information from others. 
- Proposed a novel association rule hiding algorithm based on privacy weight for each attribute in OSN user 
profiles. 
- Provide experimental and performance evaluation of the proposed algorithm. 
The rest of paper is organized as follow: section2 presents a set of related backgrounds. Section 3, includes the 
proposed framework for hiding sensitive knowledge from user profiles. Section 4, includes the implementation of 
proposed algorithm and finally section 5 performance evaluation of proposed algorithm followed by conclusion and 
references. 
2. Related background 
Privacy preserving data mining is a new research area that investigates the side-effects of data mining methods that 
originate from the penetration into the privacy of individuals and organizations. 
We assume that only sensitive are given and purpose an algorithm to modify data in database. Some private 
information could be easily discovered by this kind of tools such as association rule mining. Therefore, the protection 
of the confidentiality of sensitive information in a database becomes a critical issue to be resolved. The problem for 
finding an optimal sanitization to a database against association rule analysis has been proven to be NP-Hard[14]. The 
research can be divided into hiding sensitive rules [13, 15-17] and sensitive items [18-20]. Vassilios S. Verykios et al. 
[13] conducted a thorough investigation and presented five algorithms for hiding sensitive association rules. They 
concluded that among the proposed algorithms there is not a best solution for all the metric, including: firstly, the 
execution time required and secondly, the side effects produced by the proposed algorithms. Later on, mush research 
has been done and focused on some issues. Shyue-Liang Wang[16] proposed algorithms to hide sensitive items instead 
of hiding sensitive association rules. The algorithm needs less number of database scans but the side effects generated 
are also high. Ali Amiri [18] presented heuristic algorithms to hide sensitive items, while maximizing data utility at 
the expense of computational efficiency. Finally, Yi-Hung Wu et al. [17] proposed a heuristic method that could hide 
sensitive association rules with limited side effects. Cryptography of anonymization techniques may be used to protect 
user profiles data [21]. 
User profiles may contain data with different level of privacy or sensitivity according to user determination. Unlike 
such related background works we propose an association rule hiding algorithm to hide such sensitive data based the 
privacy setting of user in his/her profile data attributes. We do not hide all knowledge extracted by mining techniques 
at all but the high utility of privacy setting by user that will be hidden. 
3.  Proposed approach 
In this paper we will concentrate on the attacks that may use the users profile to discover the identities of such users 
even to attack it or recommending services. We encourage recommending suitable service to user but with a tradeoff 
with their privacy. 
The objective of this paper is to propose a novel association rule hiding (ARH) algorithm to hide the sensitive 
knowledge that can be discovered from publishing user's profile. The ARH algorithm will based on the utility / weight 
of privacy concerns of most sensitive attribute for each user to prevent breach of user privacy. 
The proposed algorithm will be mainly based on: 
1- Reconstruct profile attributes by setting privacy level to each attribute. 
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2- Construct association rule hiding algorithm based on utility of privacy setting. 
The idea of the proposed technique or a framework ;as shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3; is to hide high sensitive profile 
attribute/s based on its weight of sensitivity not only based on support and confidence thresholds. We can generate 
the set of frequent patterns but from privacy concerns it's not interesting by taking into consideration the profile 
weights of sensitivity. On the other hand, a less frequent pattern may be generated but it has a high utility. 
 
 
Fig.2: The proposed framework. 
Algorithm 1: User profile reconstruction  
Input: Set of user's profiles 
Output: Weighted user profile attributes 
1. for each user's profile  
2. do  
3. set privacy weight for each profile's attributes  
4. end 
5. end 
 
Algorithm 2: Profile weighted privacy 
Input: User's profiles with attribute-sets privacy weighted 
Output: Set of privacy utility of attribute-sets  
1. for each attribute-set 
2. Compute the weighted privacy utility in the overall profiles sets  
2.1 weighted privacy utility of an attribute: 
sum of weighted privacy weight in each profile 
3. Compute the profile weighted privacy utility 
3.1 for each profile containing attribute-sets  
3.1.1 sum all privacy weight of each profile contains such attribute-sets 
4. end 
 
Algorithm 3: hiding sensitive profile's attribute-sets 
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Inputs: set of frequent attribute-sets with privacy weighted utility; 
            threshold of sensitive weighted utility  
Output: set of profiles sets with hidden of sensitive attribute-sets 
1. for each frequent attribute-sets with privacy weighted utility >  
      threshold of sensitive weighted utility 
2. do 
3. modify the profiles attribute-sets such that 
none of such high sensitive frequent attribute-sets can be generated. 
4. release such profiles sets 
5. end 
6.end 
Fig. 3: proposed algorithms. 
4. Proposed system in practice 
The following table 1 contains a sample of user's attributes profiles database. Each number of profile attribute 
represent a specific attribute in profile. We will use a sample datasets from [22] of Pokec social network [23]. 
 
            Table 1: Setting profile attributes.                                         Table 2: Samples of the set of frequent patterns. 
# Profile attributes Weight of attribute 
U1 3 ,5 ,1, 2, 4, 6 1 ,3 ,5 ,10 ,6, 5 
U2 3 ,5 ,2 ,4 3 ,3, 8 ,6 
U3 3, 1, 4 1 ,5 ,2 
U4 3, 5, 1 ,7 6, 6, 10, 5 
U5 3, 5, 2, 7 2 ,3 ,4 ,2 
 
 Each tuple in table 1 contains a set of user's profile attributes. It contains weight of privacy for each profile attribute. 
The weight measures the privacy level from user perspective. In table 2 a samples of the set of frequent pattern of 
attribute-sets with support minsup= 30 and confidence minconf=70.  
Mining of user's profiles frequent patterns suffer from considering the user request and/or its weight. We will find the 
set of frequent patterns considering the profile weight.  
The following table 3, shows samples of mining frequent pattern by using its weight of utility with minimum utility 
of 20. A minimum utility may be different according to the utility engine. 
  
Table 3: utility of frequent pattern attributes. 
# Frequent attribute/s support utility 
1 1 0.6 20 
2 2 0.6 22 
… 
22 1 2 4 6   0.2 26 
23 3 5   0.8 27 
24 1 3 5 7   0.2 27 
… 
36 2 3 4 5   0.4 40 
The utility of frequent attribute-set is the sum of its weight in a profile of user privacy setting;  e.g. frequent attribute/s 
(1,3,5) in U1; utility (1,3,5)=1+3+5=9 . Now the utility of an attribute-set in the whole dataset of user's profiles is the 
sum of its utility in all profiles where it appears. In our case for attributes (1, 3, 5) =9(U1) + 22(U3) = 31. It is noted 
that attributes(1,3,5) in rule#19 (red row) in table2, don't  meet the specified minsup but in the same time it has a high 
utility from privacy concerns such issue is a problem of mining frequent pattern that doesn't consider the utility or 
weight of an attribute/s. 
Our proposed technique or a framework is to hide high sensitive profile attribute/s based on its weight of 
sensitivity not only based on support and confidence thresholds. As we can generate the set of frequent patterns but 
from privacy concerns it's not interesting by taking into consideration the profile weights of sensitivity. Also it may 
not generate less frequent pattern but it has a high utility. 
Rule# Rule with support and confidence 
R1 5 ->3 Sup=4 Conf=100  
R2 3 ->5 Sup=4 Conf=80  
… 
R18 2  4 ->3 Sup=2 Conf=100  
R19 1  5 ->3 Sup=2 Conf=100  
R20 1  4 ->3 Sup=2 Conf=100  
… 
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To concentrate, the hiding of frequent pattern attribute-set will not depend on its support but also it's utility. In the 
table 4, we will filter utility of frequent pattern attributes in table 3 to get high utility frequent patterns and meet the 
specified minsup and utility. In this experiment we set the minimum utility to be between 30 and 40.  
 
Table 4: high utility attribute-sets. 
# Frequent patterns support utility 
2 2 4   0.4 30 
3 2 5   0.6 31 
4 1 3 5   0.4 31 
5 2 3 4   0.4 34 
6 2 4 5   0.4 36 
7 2 3 5   0.6 37 
8 2 3 4 5   0.4 40 
 
The following table 5, shows the set of rules which have a high utility.  
Table 5: high utility rules (40>=utility >=30). 
Rule# Rule with support and confidence 
R4 2 ->5 Sup=3 Conf=100  
R7 5 ->2 Sup=3 Conf=75  
… 
R21 2  3  4 ->5 Sup=2 Conf=100  
R22 2  4  5 ->3 Sup=2 Conf=100  
R23 3  4  5 ->2 Sup=2 Conf=100  
It is noticed that rules: e.g. R1, R2, R3 and R5 in table 2, will not appear, although it meets the minsup and confidence 
but its utility less than the predefined threshold of utility (40>=utility >=30) and measure such other rules that doesn't 
appear likewise. It notice that approximately half of generated rule has become less sensitive rule based on its utility. 
Rules R21, R22, R23 of attribute/s (2, 3, 4, 5); in table 5; has less support than minsup but it has a highest utility at all 
of utility=40. So such attribute-sets are more sensitive e.g. 2, 3, 4, or 5. We need to hide such rule that leads to such 
sensitive attribute-sets. The support and utility for each discovered sensitive attributes (2, 3, 4, 5) in the whole dataset, 
see table 6. 
 
Table 6: sensitive attribute/s support and utility. 
Attribute support  utility 
2 0.6 22 
3 1 13 
4 0.6 14 
5 0.8 15 
One question may be raised which rule hiding based will use support or utility or an attribute. Start with a high utility 
attribute which is attribute 2. The following table 7, show the set of rules after hiding attribute 2 from dataset. 
 
Table 7: after hiding attribute 2. 
rule# rule 
1 5 ->3 Sup=4 Conf=100  
2 3 ->5 Sup=4 Conf=80  
3 4 ->3 Sup=3 Conf=100  
4 1 ->3 Sup=3 Conf=100  
5 7 ->5 Sup=2 Conf=100  
6 7 ->3 Sup=2 Conf=100  
7 3  7 ->5 Sup=2 Conf=100  
8 5  7 ->3 Sup=2 Conf=100  
9 4  5 ->3 Sup=2 Conf=100  
10 1  5 ->3 Sup=2 Conf=100  
11 1  4 ->3 Sup=2 Conf=100  
But this assumption may raise a high sensitive based utility rule/s (e.g. rule 10) of attributes (1, 3, and 5) that has a 
utility of 31. Now try to hide attribute (5) of second high utility the resulted rules are in table 8. 
 
Table 8: after hiding attribute 5. 
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rule # rules 
1 4 ->3 Sup=3 Conf=100  
2 2 ->3 Sup=3 Conf=100  
3 1 ->3 Sup=3 Conf=100  
4 7 ->3 Sup=2 Conf=100  
5 2  4 ->3 Sup=2 Conf=100  
6 1  4 ->3 Sup=2 Conf=100  
This assumption also may arise a high sensitive based utility rule/s (e.g. rule 5) of attribute/s (2, 3, and 4) that has a 
utility of 34. If we try to hide 3 and 5 from dataset, no more rules will be generated. If we use the high support of 
utility attributes with is 3, hide such attributes from the dataset; see table 9. We will see a high utility frequent attribute-
sets (2, 4 and 5) of utility 36. 
 
               Table 9: after hide attribute 3.                                                                  Table 10: After hiding attributes (2,5) 
rule # rule 
 1 2 ->5 Sup=3 Conf=100  
2 5 ->2 Sup=3 Conf=75  
 3 7 ->5 Sup=2 Conf=100  
4 2  4 ->5 Sup=2 Conf=100  
5 4  5 ->2 Sup=2 Conf=100  
Experiments show that hiding top high utility attributes; attributes (2, 5); will generate a set of rules that has a less 
utility of privacy. See table 10 after hiding attributes (2, 5) from the dataset. 
Such sanitizing dataset can be securely publish to a third party application or recommender service system as shown 
in Fig.2 without disclosure any sensitive profile data attribute and no more high utility sensitive rule/s will be 
discovered. 
5. Performance evaluation  
A comparative analysis, in Fig. 4, in terms of number of hidden rules in case of using a privacy utility weight and 
without using a privacy weight of utility. It's noticed that the number of rules to be hidden in using a privacy weight 
is more than the other one. In addition the possibility of an adversary to recover a sensitive rule based on the non-
sensitive ones will be zero.  This means that the information loss in user profiles analysis is less with a trade-off of 
protecting the user's profiles. In addition, Fig. 5, demonstrates the changes in user's profiles attributes is less than hide 
sensitive attribute without setting a privacy weight of profile attribute-sets. As a result we can generate the set of 
frequent patterns but from privacy concerns it's not interesting by taking into consideration the profile weights of 
sensitivity. On the other hand, a less frequent pattern may be generated but it has a high utility. 
 
                       Fig. 4: Number of hidden rules comparative analysis.                                      Fig. 5: No.of user's profiles attributes changed. 
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1 4 ->3 Sup=3 Conf=100  
2 1 ->3 Sup=3 Conf=100  
3 7 ->3 Sup=2 Conf=100  
4 1  4 ->3 Sup=2 Conf=100  
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Conclusion  
 
In this paper we have proposed a framework for hiding sensitive data attributes in OSN user's profiles. The proposed 
framework based on two main steps. Firstly, reconstruct profile attributes by setting privacy level to each attribute. 
Secondly, construct an association rule hiding algorithm based on utility of privacy setting. A mining analysis attack 
can be conducted by other users or third party social network application on user's profiles data to discover the relevant 
pattern of users. The proposed framework will protect the user's profiles sensitive frequent attribute-sets. As a future 
work we will add the user recommendation preferences as a privacy utility to protect the user's profiles data. 
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